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Among the other bequests in the 1484 will of Andriana Michiel, wife of the
Venetian noble Francesco Priuli, was a contribution of 2,000 ducats toward the
dowry of Andriana’s daughter, Eugenia. If, however, Eugenia chose not to
marry but instead to become a nun, the bequest was to be halved and the
remaining 1,000 ducats allocated as follows: 550 to finance the building of a
chapel to the Virgin at the convent of Santa Maria degli Angeli on Murano,
where Andriana wished to be buried, and the remaining 450 to endow daily
mass in perpetuity in that chapel for Andriana’s soul1. In making those
provisions Andriana resembles Fina Buzzacarini, the wife of the fourteenth-
century lord of Padua, Francesco da Carrara, as revealed in Ben Kohl’s study
of her will2. Kohl portrayed Fina under three heads, as wife, as mother, and as
patron. But in his subtle analysis these separate categories converged as
dimensions of a single attribute, that of benefactress, of the many people,
including her daughters, whom she benefited as well as of the fresco cycles
that she commissioned for the baptistery of the church of Il Santo in Padua.
Like Andriana Michiel, Fina da Carrara used her will and her wealth to impose
her identity lastingly as a patron – of family members and other persons, of
institutions, and of a visible monument to her piety.  
The two women used their wills as vehicles for the two most familiar kinds
of patronage, maecenatism, or the encouragement of artistic production, and
clientelism, a relationship involving the performance of reciprocal but
differential functions between more and less powerful interests3. Renaissance
maecenatism by women has come under increasing scholarly scrutiny,
prominently and early in the collection that hosted Kohl’s article4. Other
Venetian patrician women besides Andriana Michiel used their wills to
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1 Archivio di Stato, Venice (ASVe), Archivio Notarile, Testamenti, busta (all hereafter abbreviated
NT) 68, notary Girolamo Bonicardi, no. 11, 23 April 1484. 
2 Kohl, 2001, 19-35. 
3 These are anglicizations of the Italian mecenatismo and clientelismo, which distinguish more
clearly than in English between the two forms of patronage. See Ianziti, 300. 
4 See also King; Hurlburt; and McIver 2012, notably the essays of Dennis and Frank; Frank.  
authorize artistic production. Holly Hurlburt has recounted dogaressa Agnese
da Mosto Venier’s authorization of a tomb for herself in the church of Santi
Giovanni e Paolo, near that of her late husband, Doge Antonio Venier, which
as one of his executors she may have a hand in commissioning5. The lavish
commissions to Tullio Lombardo by Agnesina Badoer Giustinian for family
tombs at San Francesco della Vigna and for her villa at Roncade have been
much studied6. In addition to these prominent women patrons, Orsa Surian
Loredan commissioned an altar painting in the convent church of Sant’ Andrea
della Zirada, where she wanted to be buried. Vittoria Vitturi Zeno bequeathed
ten ducats for a marble tablet to be installed over her chosen burial place, her
natal family’s tomb in the monastery of the Servi7. More ambitious, Chiara
Barbaro Zane was elaborate and precise: 
“Item: I wish to be buried under the portico of San Stae, where my husband is buried. I also
want built in that church an altar in honor of Our Lady. In the space for the altarpiece I want
my icon with relics, to be flanked by two wings. On one, I want depicted four figures, namely
San Giovanni Battista, Santa Chiara, San Bartolomeo, and Sant’ Alvise. On the other wing
I want a representation of the Visitation of Our Lady, different from another altarpiece of
Our Lady in the same church. My altar is to be called the altar of the Visitation. Item: I
want it to have an altarcloth, a chalice, and at the foot of the altar a cloth or an altarpiece
that blends with the altarpiece above. And for all of this I allocate 100 ducats”8.
To this bequest she added three ducats for an altar lamp (“cesendolo”),
which was to burn continuously, and a sufficient amount to be invested in a
state fund to yield three ducats annually for a priest “de bona condition e fama”
to celebrate daily mass for her and her husband’s souls.
Chiara Zane knew exactly how she wanted her commission executed,
making her exceptional among the small number of women who authorized the
construction or embellishment of tombs and altars; most left the details to
their executors9. The few male testators who commissioned tombs did as well,
though the evidence of men building original tombs is as rare as it is for
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5 Hurlburt also discusses the tombs of other dogaresse: 132-40.
6 King, 48-63; Lewis, 355-68; McIver, 2012, 63.
7 NT 68, Bonicardi, no. 308, 5 April 1486 (Orsa); NT 852 Francesco Rizoto, no. 349, 31 July 1427
(Vittoria). For the lapide bequest of the dogaressa Agnesina Venier, see Hurlburt. 
8 “Item voio esser sepelida soto el portego dela gliexia de San Stadi dove è sepolto el corpo de mio
marido, in la qual giexia voio sia fato uno altare a reverentia de nostra dona. Et in luogo de la palla
voio chel sia posto la mia anchona dale relige azonzandoli do ladi. In un ladi voio chel sia quatro
figure zioè San Zan Batista, Santa Clara, San Bortholamio e Santo Alvixe. In laltro ladi sia la
representacion de la visitacion de nostra dona a diferentia de uno altro altare che [=che è] in la
giexia dela nostra dona. E sia clamado laltare dela visitacion. Item voio chel dito altare habia uno
paramento e uno calexe e uno pano davanti over una palla dal pe’ del altar conveniente ala palla
de sora. Et per queste cosse sia spexo ducati cento”. ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie
[hereafter PSMC] de Ultra, b. 315, “Chiara Zane”, unnumbered parchment, 29 September 1440.
9 Hurlburt, 143-44, suggests that dogaressa Agnese Venier’s tomb, which she specifically requested
for herself, was turned by her son, as her executor, into instead a celebration of her family, thus
circumscribing the dogaressa within the traditional female role. 
women10. Most men wanted to be buried in existing family tombs (which of
course had been built by men of previous generations). In a group of forty-two
men who specified their preferred burial sites, twenty-five, or three-fifths,
requested interment with members of their lineage, as did Paolo Priuli, who
stated his preference for “our tomb of Ca’ Priuli,” and Piero Morosini, who
specified “the tomb of my grandfather, Francesco Morosini ‘the Stout’”11.
Another six referred to “my tomb [monumento meo, archa mea],” which may
also have denoted family tombs built by male ancestors, although at least two
of the testators left instructions and allocated funds for the construction of
new tombs12. Women’s burial preferences were oriented less to family and
lineage, more toward communities of women. In a group of 111 women who
chose burial sites, sixty-eight elected interment in a female convent – at 61.3
percent almost the same proportion of men who wanted burial with their
patrilineage13. 
Choosing a burial site, as Chiara and other women already mentioned did,
is a form of patronage to be treated elsewhere, though we have already noted
above that Orsa Loredan wanted her commission of an altar painting executed
in the convent where, like three-fifths of the women, she requested
entombment among the nuns. However, maecenatism, cultural patronage such
as Andriana Michiel’s, Orsa Loredan’s, and Chiara Zane’s, is not the main
subject of this essay but rather the presence in women’s wills of the other main
kind of patronage, clientelism, patronage as a form of social and political
relations. It has long attracted the interest of scholars, from historians of
ancient Rome to anthropologists of Mediterranean regions to interpreters of
modern Italian politics14. Two themes appear regularly in this body of writing.
One is the hierarchical nature of the patron-client relationship: a stronger,
more authoritative or influential person providing some benefit to a
dependent, either on a particular occasion or in an enduring relationship of
recurring benefactions in exchange for the client’s loyalty and support. Richard
Graham gives a succinct definition of this function as normally rendered:
“Clientelism involves asymmetric but mutually beneficial relationships of
power and exchange, a nonuniversalistic quid pro quo between individuals or
groups of unequal standing”15. Graham’s definition also includes the second
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10 For examples of tomb commissions by men, see Goffen, esp. 37-68. 
11 Paolo: “larcha nostra da cha de Prioli”, NT 1254, Pietro Zane, 215, 27 January 1466/67. Piero:
“larcha fo de mio avo miser Franzescho Moresini dito lo graso”, NT 567 Bartolomeo fu Benvenuto,
unnumbered, 1 June 1397. 
12 Bartolomeo q. Piero Bragadin, San Severo, NT 1238, Tomeo Tomei, 2nd numbering, no. 91,
(date and month left blank) 1474; Donato q. Prodocimo Arimondo, NT 66 Busenello, no. 126, 8
September 1499. 
13 I discuss gender differences in the choice of burial sites more fully in Chojnacki forthcoming.
14 See, respectively, Syme, Campbell and Putnam. 
15 Graham continues: “Those in control – patrons, subpatrons, and brokers – provide selective
access to goods and opportunities and place themselves or their supporters in positions from
which they can divert resources and services in their favor. Their partners – clients – are expected
prominent theme in clientage studies, reciprocity between patron and client.
The asymmetry in a clientelist relationship refers not only and not always to
the superior status or power of the patron but to the different forms of the
exchange, with the client, in return for material or other benefits, giving the
patron political support, dutiful functions, or loyalty that enhances the patron’s
prestige.  
This hierarchically inflected transaction has been well studied in the case
of Renaissance Florence16. Nevertheless, some commentators argue that it
could also exist as a pattern of favor-exchange among equals or near equals.
For Ronald Weissman, “The frequent blurring of patronage and friendship in
ancient Rome and Renaissance Florence should warn us against
overemphasizing the socially hierarchical features of patronage to the exclusion
of other aspects of the relationship”17. Dale Kent emphasizes the critical role of
friendship in Florentine society: “Economic and business transactions – loans,
partnerships, and credit – depended, like friendship, on trust (fede, fiducia),
and trust depended on the existence of personal ties between the parties”. The
result, according to Kent, was that “the most significant patronage relations
frequently existed between social equals”18. In this register, favors and gifts
between equals could be configured as a potlatch, with both persons in the
sequence of exchanges taking turns as patron19. Closer to home, in a series of
studies on Venice, Dennis Romano also found that “clientelist” patronage
consolidated relations between equals as well as ties across class lines such as
those between masters (and mistresses) and servants20. 
This latter form of patronage, members of social networks exchanging
conferrals of responsibility and authority, is the focus of this essay, with
particular emphasis on reciprocal delegations in the wills of wives and
husbands. Central to such mutuality is the evolution of relationships between
spouses within the orbits of the social networks of each. Analyzing the necessity
of constantly renewing network associations, also with a focus on Florence,
Paul McLean emphasizes what he calls “the interactionally constructed
identities” of the parties in a patron-client relationship. McLean elaborates:
“We become more fully the persons we are through interaction, our
personhood being constructed out of a number of different identities we adopt,
singly or in combination, in different interactional settings”21. Looking at
reciprocal gestures of friendship as a way of imprinting identities on one
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to return their benefactors’ help, politically and otherwise, by working for them at election times
or boosting their patron’s prestige and reputation”. As quoted in Roniger, 353-54. 
16 See, e.g., Kent, 1987, and Weissman.  
17 Weissman, 35.
18 Kent, 2009, 8-9.
19 For an interpretation of Venetian patrician marriage and dowry practices as potlatch, see
Sperling, 18-24.
20 Romano, 1984, 1989, 1993.
21 McLean, xi, 1-2.
another echoes observations made some years ago by Thomas Kuehn, also
with reference to Florence. Discussing female gift-giving there, Kuehn argued
that personhood “arises within a complex of social relationships, and the more
relationships acquired the more complete personhood becomes”22. One of the
ways in which clientelism and interactionally constructed identities overlap is
in their continuous reiteration over time, with actions of patronage and
clientage alternating between the parties, renewing and strengthening existing
relationships. Again to cite McLean, “Networks, are, ironically, more about
flux than stasis. . . . Relationships with others to whom one is connected must
be repeatedly managed, deepened, or contained as circumstances change.
Positions must be improved or the persons in them languish”23. Ben Kohl’s
account of Fina da Carrara’s will offers a good example. The lavish frescoing
of the baptistery of Il Santo that she commissioned included portraits of herself
and her three daughters, providing a visual record of her patronage that would
endure into the future. At the same time, her will also included generous dowry
portions to her ladies-in-waiting, rewarding their past loyalty to her and
similarly recasting her continued identity as their beneficent patron after her
death24. 
By their very nature, Fina da Carrara’s and Andriana Michiel’s bequests,
like all such benefactions in wills, document existing relationships and promote
their continuation, shaping their future psychological contours by eliciting from
beneficiaries reciprocity in the form of gratitude and the performance of certain
functions designated by the testator. Bequests could also add new dimensions
to relationships. Both Fina and Andriana extended their benevolence to their
husbands’ bastards: Fina bequeathed 200 lire to Margherita, Francesco da
Carrara’s daughter by his mistress, and Andriana left 200 ducats for the
marriage or monacation of Lucrezia, “the natural daughter of my husband,
Francesco”. These bequests may have been bids for the grateful loyalty of the
illegitimate girls while at the same time leveling subtle reproofs to the girls’
errant fathers. That suggestion is reinforced by the women’s provisions for their
husbands. Neither Fina nor Andriana made a direct bequest to her husband;
Andriana only stipulated that her Francesco was to get Lucrezia’s 200-ducat
legacy if the girl died before choosing her vocation25. Yet in a further sign of
distrust, Andriana also mandated that her executors remove her property from
her husband’s possession immediately (“subito”) after her death26. The two
women’s wills are also different in that Fina appointed her husband, Francesco
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22 Kuehn.
23 McLean, 226.
24 Kohl, 2001, 23-24.
25 He was also to get half of her residual estate, after all charitable and family bequests were
disbursed, but only if her daughter Eugenia, who was to receive the residuum in addition to her
dowry bequest, died young. The other half was to go to Andriana’s married sister.
26 “Hoc tamen declarato et volo quod subito post mortem meam omnia et quecumque bona mea
extrahantur de manibus ipsius domini Francisci viri mei”. NT 68, Bonicardi, no. 11, 23 April 1484. 
da Carrara, as executor of her will. By contrast, and consistent with her
instruction to extract her property from her husband, Andriana Michiel left him
out of the administration of her estate, instead naming as executors her brother,
a cardinal of the church; her sister, prioress of the convent where Andriana
wanted her burial and endowed a chapel; a married sister and the latter’s
husband; and a cousin from her natal Priuli lineage.
In this paper I concentrate on the kind of clientelist patronage just mentioned
in reference to Andriana’s will, namely, her choice of executors, with some
additional discussion of women’s family orientation as it affected their
participation in the vocations of their children. Material benefactions are another,
and perhaps even more obvious, form of testamentary patronage, and some of
these will find their way into the discussion. But they entail reciprocity to a lesser
degree than the designation of executors (“commissari”). Moreover, where
married women are concerned, the bulk of benefactions went to their children, so
they display less than does the appointment of commissari the central concern of
this paper: the social orientation of patrician wives and how it compares with that
of their husbands.
Andriana Michiel’s choice of executors displays the range of patronage
possibilities available to married Venetian women who, as freely as men, were
able to choose their beneficiaries, unlike their Florentine counterparts whose
dowry property from 1415 was statutorily destined for their husbands and
children27. With more reason to write wills, therefore, they had more occasion
to select executors to carry out their intentions. The appointment of executors,
who as a group constituted a commissaria, was, like Fina da Carrara’s bequest
to her ladies-in-waiting, the reformulation of a testator’s relationship with them,
a means by which the relationship was, recalling McLean’s words, “managed,
deepened, or contained as circumstances change”. Testators chose a group of
executors whose past acquaintance encouraged trust, and discharging the duties
of an executor by its nature entailed a changed relationship with the testator.
More particularly, the appointment of executors was an act of patronage, in the
obvious sense that most testators left bequests to their commissari, but also in
two other ways. For one, it assigned them the management of property.
Venetian testators usually targeted their bequests specifically, but they also
often gave their commissari discretion in administering estates, particularly in
carrying out their charitable and pious bequests. For example, like many other
Venetians, Andriana Michiel financed the marriages of “three poor maidens of
good standing and reputation,” allocating sixty ducats to beneficiaries to be
selected by her executors28. Commissari were also empowered to administer
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27 On the restrictions limiting Florentine married women’s rights to dispose of their wealth, see now
Chabot, 2011, 43-60. Chabot’s discussion surveys testamentary rights of women elsewhere in Italy
and in France.
28 “Tribus pauperibus novitiis bone condictionis et fame”. Another example: “Item dimitto quod
dari debeant ducati quinquaginta auri ex bonis meis pro subsidio maritandi quinque ex nostris
other kinds of charitable bequests: Maria Venier, wife of Piero Sanudo, wanted
five ducats to be distributed to the poor of her home parish of San Felice “per i
mie commessarie”29.
Thus executors administered the property bequeathed in wills, exercising
the latitude granted them in dispensing and investing it, especially in cases
like Andriana Michiel’s and that of Maria Venier Sanudo, just mentioned. Like
Andriana, Maria declined to appoint her husband as an executor, instead
naming only her father, mother, and three brothers. Their examples were not
rare. In a group of 205 married women’s wills, thirty-six of the testatresses, 17.6
percent, left their husbands out of their commissaria. In such situations of
apparent distrust, a married woman chose executors who could be relied on to
protect her estate against a rapacious or dilatory widower. That meant, first of
all, retrieving her dowry, which her husband enjoyed the use of during
marriage but which remained her property, to be dispensed as she chose in
her will or when widowed30. Thus Bernardo Bembo, one of the executors of
his sister, a deceased widow, was authorized by the Giudici del Proprio to
retrieve her dowry from the estate of her late husband, Bernardo Grimani;
Vinciguerra Giustinian, an executor of his sister, late wife of Marco Querini,
received similar authorization31. These two cases alert us to the role of natal
kinsmen in safeguarding the interests of married women, and signal the
women’s complex familial orientation.
In the event of non-compliance by a surviving husband or the administrators
of a deceased husband’s estate, it fell to the woman’s commissari to pursue the
claim in court. Wives were aware of that prospect. Cristina Priuli urged her
husband to transfer her property to her estate within two months of her death on
pain of forfeiting her 150-ducat bequest to him32. Maria Valaresso’s bequest to her
husband was to let him keep her dowry. But if he challenged (“molestare”) any
of the other provisions of her will, her sister Cristina, as her sole executor, was
to force him to yield that property up33. Maria Sanudo urged her commissari “to
be vigilant and solicitous in obtaining my residuary estate and investing it
immediately [in presenti dì]” in shares of the state’s funded debt (prestiti), letting
income accrue to the principal for any children she might have; if there were no
children the residuum was to go to her father, “from whom I received that
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dominabus nobilibus pauperibus pro anima mea, vz ducati decem pro qualibet earum”. Will of
Suordamor Contarini Morosini, 23 December 1482. NT 68 Bonicardi, no. 289. 
29 NT 1186, Domenico di Groppi, no. 100 in protocollo, no. 122 in loose sheets.
30 On the husband’s possession of the dowry, while the wife retained proprietorship of it, see now
Bellavitis, 58-59. On the procedure and practice of dowry restitution, see Chojnacki, 2000b.
31 ASVe, Giudici del Proprio, De Giudicato, reg. 2, fols. 38v, 78v.
32 “[V]oglio che mio marido dia sti danari fuora fra mexi do, e non fazendo voio sia privado de
quelo i laso qui de soto”. NT 986, Francesco Rogeri, no. 8, 13 January 1442/3. In Genoa, according
to Epstein, legacies were normally paid out within one year of the testator’s death, 221-22.
33 “Christina possit et debeat predictum virum meam astringere de tota illa quantitate quam michi
tenetur et obligatur predictus vir meus”. NT 985, Francesco Rogeri no. 3, 6 March 1441. 
property”34. Andriana Michiel, Maria Valaresso, Maria Sanudo, and the thirty-
three other married women who left their husbands out of the administration of
their estates were exercising a kind of negative patronage, denying them their
trust and the authority to manage the wives’ property, and identifying natal kin
as more likely to carry out the testatress’s instructions with discretion and fidelity,
another indication of enduring ties between married women and their families
of origin.
Whether or not husbands were among them, the executors appointed by
married women shared in the credit for the distribution of bequests, especially
when they were assigned to choose the recipients. Providing this credit, and the
moral and social prestige that flowed from it, was the other kind of patronage that
testators bestowed on their commissari. Bianca Lando in 1452 instructed that if
she died childless, half of her residuary estate was to go to her husband, the other
half to be distributed to the parishes of San Canciano and Santa Margherita “per
mie comessarii per anima mia”35. Orsa Contarini in 1419 made several pious
bequests: fifteen soldi each to watchers who were to keep a vigil over her body
for a day and a night before its interment in the convent of Corpus Domini; four
ducats to each of twelve unmarried girls for their dowries; five ducats each to
ten poor prisoners, presumably for lamp oil; payment for masses of St. Gregory
and an additional one thousand masses; and expenses for pilgrims to
Compostela, Assisi, and Rome to pray for her soul: “and all these bequests are to
be carried out at the discretion of my executors,” who were her husband, his
mother, one of Orsa’s married sisters, and an aunt36. In selecting the recipients
of such bequests, executors participated in the patronage of the testator,
managing the property from which the bequests were to be paid and disbursing
them. Indeed, whether authorizing them to choose beneficiaries or directing
them to convey bequests to specific recipients, a testator’s choice of executors
reflected trust in their capacity and willingness to preserve the testator’s identity
beyond the grave by realizing her or his ultimate intentions.
Nowhere did this transaction associate testator with executors more
intimately than in assignments to decide the vocations of daughters. Many male
testators entrusted that responsibility to their wives, as Filippo Priuli did in
1485: “my daughters should be married or monacated when it seems
appropriate to Cristina, their mother and my executor”37. Similarly, Piero
126
Stanley Chojnacki
34 “Item voio che i mie commessarii siano vigilanti he soliziti de aver el mio rexidio he de quelo
conprar in presenti dì [prestiti] che el debia conservar pro sora cavedal”; “voio che quel mio rexidio
sora dito vegna in mio padre dal qual ho rexevuto i diti beni”.
35 NT 1156, Benedetto dalle Croci, no. 512, 11 September 1452. 
36 “[L]aso che a tutti questi sia satisfado secondo la discrecion di mie comessarii”. NT 1254, Pietro
Zane, no. 25, 6 October 1419. Orsa’s arithmetic was faulty: she specified four ducats for each girl’s
dowry, but allocated a total of 50 ducats for the bequest.
37 “Filie mee maritari aut monacari debeant quando videbitur ipsi Christine earum matri
commissarie mee”. NT 68, Girolamo Bonicardi, no. 72, 22 December 1485.
Morosini, instructing that his daughter was not to marry before age fourteen,
added, “Item, I will that my aforesaid daughter is not to marry without the
consent [senza volentade] of my aforesaid wife, Valvina,” who was one of his
executors38. Such commissions reflected a high degree of trust and
understanding between wife and husband; it also gave the delegated widows
the means of forging or strengthening ties to other families by negotiating
marriage alliances. Testating wives had no need to authorize their husbands to
arrange daughters’ marriages, which of course was normally the men’s
prerogative as heads of their families. Despite customary paternal authority,
however, some mothers assigned that responsibility to the executors they
selected, leveraging the influence they gained from their contributions to their
daughters’ dowries39. Isabetta da Lezze, who counterbalanced her husband’s
presence among her executors by also including her two brothers, “beseech[ed]”
the three to marry her daughter, whom Isabetta had made her residuary heir,
before her eighteenth birthday40. Maria Soranzo also made her daughter her
residuary heir, but she instructed that if she gave birth to a boy, the residuum
was to be divided between him and the girl, “and I want my daughter Prudenza
to have, over and above her share of the residuum, enough extra as my
commissari deem necessary for her marriage – though not more than 200
ducats extra”41. Those commissari were her husband, her mother, and her three
brothers. Similarly protective of her sons, Orsa Balbi bequeathed her residuum
to her children, but advised her executors – her husband, her mother, two aunts
and two uncles – that “if I have daughters, they should have for their marriages
whatever share seems right to my commissari – as long as my sons do not
suffer”42. Like the mothers commissioned by husbands to arrange their
daughters’ marriages, executors given that assignment by married women could
enhance their own social positions by brokering alliances between families. 
Because executors had the responsibility of managing property and
children, married testatresses took thoughtful care in choosing them. In doing
so most seem to have been influenced, like Cristina Priuli mentioned earlier,
by the need to retrieve their dowry property from their husbands’ control in
order to finance their bequests. We noted that thirty-six of the 205 married
testatresses left their husbands out of the management of their estates. But even
those who did appoint them for the most part bracketed that choice with others,
chiefly their natal kin. Twenty of the women named their husbands as their sole
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38 NT 567, Bartolomeo fu Benvenuto, unnumbered, 1 June 1397.
39 On mothers’ contributions to their daughters’ dowries, see Queller and Madden; Bellavitis, 197-98.
40 “Obsecrans meos commissarios ut eam maritare vellint antequam perveniat ad etatem annorum
decemocto”. NT 1238, Tomei, part II, no. 220, 4 May 1465.
41 “Volo quod dicta Prudentia filia mea habeat et habere debeat ultra suam partem dicti mei residui
pro suo maritare illud plus quod videbitur dictis meis commissariis. Ita tamen quod id plus non
ecedat ducatos ducentos”. NT 558, Gambaro no. 54, 10 January 1437/38.
42 “Et se havesse fie, voio che al suo maridar le habino la sua parte, secondo che parerà ali mie commessarii,
tutavia che li mascoli non remagnino desfati”. NT 68, Bonicardi, no. 329, 26 October 1489. 
executors, clearly a sign of trust and regard, and another sixteen appointed their
husbands together with their adult children. In three and possibly four of these
last cases, however, the adult children were married daughters, as was true of
Isabetta Pisani’s commissari: her husband and her two sons, but also her two
married daughters and their husbands43. Another Isabetta, married to Nicolò da
Canal, left her residuary estate to her daughter Andriana “pro eius maritare,”
and only if the girl instead chose the convent would Isabetta’s son, Alessandro,
inherit the residuum, minus 200 ducats for Andriana’s convent dowry. To
ensure that these daughter-favoring provisions were carried out, Isabetta
appointed as commissari her husband and also Andriana herself and her other
daughter, Franceschina, and the latter’s husband44.
Married daughters and sons-in-law could neutralize or even outvote
husbands, if necessary. Despite the power of paternal authority, the bequest
choices of a woman whose substantial dowry property could significantly enrich
her daughters’ dowries, as enforced by executors, exerted considerable influence
on daughters’ vocations. Maria Zane bequeathed 600 ducats to each of her three
daughters. More precisely directive was Franceschina Contarini, who showed
her awareness of dubious activities in some convents by giving her daughter
500 ducats whether she married or entered an observant convent, but nothing
if she chose a non-observant one. And Caterina Querini willed her married
daughter, Lucia, the 2,000 ducats she had promised in Lucia’s marriage
contract45. Each of these bequests was made at a time when the average
patrician dowry was 1,230 ducats and the maximum allowed by law 1,600
ducats46. To further enforce heavily subsidized preferences such as these,
moreover, 119 (70.4 percent) of the 169 women who included their husbands
among their executors divided responsibility for children and estate between
their husbands and members of their own families of origin; and 95 of these
119 (80 percent) included more than one natal family member in their
commissaria. This weight of numbers served as a deterrent to potential efforts
by husbands to deviate from their wives’ intentions. Viewing it more positively,
it also promoted the involvement of a woman’s natal family in her children’s
futures, if not outright collaboration between them and her husband, providing
the children oversight and support from two families and kin groups. Examples
of such planning are Lucia Trevisan, who appointed both her husband and his
father and offset, or complemented, them by also naming her mother and her
four brothers; and Cateruzza Venier, who chose her father and mother as well
as her husband and his mother47.
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43 NT 1238, Tomei, part II, no. 258, 20 October 1467. 
44 NT 1186, Groppi, no. 33, 9 January 1481/82. 
45 NT 68, Bonicardi, no. 210, 16 May 1479 (Maria); NT 986, Rogeri, no 18, 20 June 1447
(Franceschina); NT 131, Pietro Bon, no. 160, 28 July 1504 (Caterina).
46 For the dowry average see Chojnacki, 2000b, 97; for the legal maximum see Idem, “Marriage
Regulation” in ibid., 54.
47 NT 558, Gambaro, no. 141, 25 October 1446 (Lucia); NT 859, Ravagnan, no. 311, 17 November
Naming their natal kin as executors alongside their husbands is the most
telling demonstration of the patronage aspect of married women’s commissari
choices. It affirmed the women’s loyalty to both families, reinforcing the ties of
trust and affection that endured between married daughters and their families
as well as those forged between spouses. That only small minorities of
testatresses either left their husbands out of their commissarie (17.6 percent)
or, in contrast, appointed them as their sole executors (9.6 percent) underscores
the predominance of the collaborative ideal espoused by the more than two-
thirds of women who safeguarded their wills and enhanced the prospects of
their children by blending natal and marital kin, chiefly their husbands, in their
commissarie. The careful thought they gave to these choices shines forth in the
designations of principal, or determining, executors. Maria Zane, for instance,
devised a balanced group including her husband, his mother, two of her sisters
and the husband of one of them, and the wife of one of her brothers; but she
made clear that in any disagreement that might arise among them regarding
her estate her husband had the deciding vote48. Contrarywise, Chiara Arimondo
appointed a commissaria consisting of her husband, her brother, her father
and her father’s sister; and whatever her father and her aunt decided would
constitute the majority decision49. Lucia Contarini also weighted her
commissaria in favor of her natal family, appointing her husband but also her
mother, her late father’s sister, and the latter’s husband; but she ensured
balance and perhaps encouraged comity by designating her mother and
husband as together constituting the “maior pars”50. Lucia was unusual in that
joint designation, but she was hardly alone in balancing patronage of both
husbands and natal families in choosing dominant executors; six other wives
made their husbands the automatic majority and eight others besides Lucia
designated a natal kinsman, usually a parent.
Married patrician women’s choices of executors show their multiform
loyalty and self-identification as they patronized members of their array of
relationships in matters with heavy material and psychological stakes. In
nearly every case the relationships were with family – natal, marital, or both;
only thirteen of the 205 married women in the sample named priests, officials,
or nobles of unknown relationship, if any, to the testatress, and always together
with at least one relative. The testimony provided by wills of the patronage
activities of married women extends beyond the executors they chose, however.
Shifting the focus to their husbands’ wills sheds additional light on women’s
roles as mediators between their marital and natal families, as patronesses of
the social cohesion that helped the patrician regime in the Quattrocento
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1406 (Cateruzza). On mothers promoting support of their sons by their brothers, see Chojnacki,
2000c.
48 “Maiorem partem volo esse et intelligi debere ipsum dominum Hieronimum maritum meum
solum”. NT 68, Bonicardi, no. 210, 16 May 1479.
49 NT 41, Bonamico, no. 54, 7 October 1490. 
50 Ibid., no. 113, 7 January 1493/94.
weather internal stresses as well as the hostility and resentment of other Italian
states and the menace of Ottoman expansion in the East51. 
Just as testating women authorized their executors, who in most cases included
their husbands, to participate in their testamentary patronage, husbands responded
in kind. Indeed, men appointed their spouses to their commissarie just as
frequently as did women. Out of a sample of seventy-seven male testators with
living wives, nearly four out of five, sixty-one or 79.2 percent, did so, as compared
with the 82.4 percent of wives who appointed their husbands. Sometimes this
reciprocity was perfectly symmetrical. Dictating his will on 2 December 1445,
Valerio Zen named his wife, Vittoria, as his sole executor; nineteen days later
Vittoria dictated her will to the same notary, in it naming Valerio as her sole
executor52. Valerio and Vittoria appear not to have had children, but husbands with
children also made their wives their only executors. Marco Loredan in 1441
appointed his wife alone and urged her to love their children “chome padre,” and
Moisè Venier not only wanted his wife, pregnant with their third son, to be his sole
executor even if she remarried (“vedoando o no”) but also authorized her to choose
the commissari who would administer his estate after her death53.
Such men’s exclusive reliance on their wives as executors deserves
comment. All three of the husbands just named had natal relatives, Valerio
and Moisè brothers and Marco unspecified kinsmen, but they all bypassed
the lineage loyalty that supposedly nourished the structural sinews of the
hereditary ruling class. Marco and Moisè gave reasons for neglecting their
agnatic kin and investing their wives with responsibility for their property
beyond the grave: Moisè stated that he was in litigation with his three brothers
over financial matters and was silent about his paternal uncles. Marco said
that none of his relatives would be surprised (“non parà da nuovo ad algun di
mie”) that he left them out of his commissaria, because all knew of his
obligation to his wife for her devoted care during his illness; his gesture of
gratitude and explanation of it show how appointing executors, whether by
husbands or wives, was an empowering act of patronage. Valerio Zeno made
no mention at all of natal kin, though in her will his wife made a dowry
bequest to a daughter of her husband’s brother, but Valerio added to his will
a long, emphatic, and somewhat defensive insistence that no challenge be
admitted to his designation of her as his universal heir54. He evidently was
worried that his natal kin might try to wrest his estate from her.
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51 For a searching account of fifteenth-century patrician politics, see Romano, 2007. For anti-
Venetian sentiment in Italy, see Rubinstein. 
52 Valerio: NT 558/a, Antonio Gambaro, no. 124; Vittoria: ibid., no. 123. Vittoria had written an
earlier will in 1427 in which also she appointed Valerio to be her sole commissario, NT 852,
Francesco Rizoto, no. 349. 
53 Marco: NT 1157, Croci, prot. 2, fol. 33v, 24 June 1441; Moisè: PSMC Misti, busta 3A, Moisè
Venier, parchment 26 July 1448. 
54 “quia intentio mea est et volo quod non obstantibus neque impedientibus aliquibus
condicionibus neque oppositionibus que quo jure modo et forma opponi et fieri possint contra
In all, eleven of the seventy-seven husbands made their wives chief patrons
of the husbands‘ estate. Four named them as their sole executor, and another
seven designated them as the deciding member of a group of executors. An
example of the latter provision is the will of Donato Arimondo who, after
appointing a commissaria consisting of his wife, his married sister, and two
male cousins, added “I want the dispensing [of my bequests] always to be done
under the direction of madona Bianca, and indeed she is to be considered the
majority”55. Another is the will of Marino Pisani, who wanted decisions
regarding his estate to be made by a majority of his commissaria, which
included his wife, his brother, his father-in-law, and all his sons and daughters
when they reached age fifteen, but “nothing is to be done without the consent
of my wife, Cateruzza”56. After enumerating his bequests, Giovanni da Mula
requested that “all this be carried out as quickly as possible by my commissari,
or by the majority of them, and I want that majority to be my darling [amabele]
consort, Lucia”, who was joined in Giovanni’s commissaria by two of their
sons and all their other children when they reached age fourteen57. These
appointments attest to husbands’ confidence that their wives either could be
trusted to execute the men’s intentions or, acting as co-patrons, would on their
own choose suitable recipients of their husbands’ largesse.
The eleven men who gave their wives exclusive or majority control over
their estates, 14 percent of the seventy-seven man sample, must be set
alongside husbands who authorized their wives’ discretion in carrying out
particular family responsibilities. A frequent assignment with vital social and
economic stake was to decide daughters’ vocations: Filippo Priuli ordered that
his five daughters “should marry or enter convents [maritari aut monacari]
when it seemed right to Cristina, who is my executor and their mother;”
Filippo’s other executors were those five daughters, which effectively gave
Cristina sole management of his estate as well as their daughters’ futures58.
On the chance that his wife might give birth to a daughter, Piero Morosini
made the girl his residuary heir with instructions that she wasn’t to marry
before age fourteen, and “the said daughter is not to marry without the consent
of her mother”59. Another Morosini, Fantin, was even more explicit, having a
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hanc presentem meam ordinationem et voluntatem, dicta Victoria semper et in omni statu et
termino, et tam viduando quam non viduando et in quocumque alio statu et termino esse possit
et declarari, semper habeat et habere debeat totum illud quod sibi dimitto”.
55 “Ma nela dispensazion volo se fazi senper [sic] con la volontà de madona Biancha e che perfino la
in vera la se intenda lei eser per la plui parti”. NT 66, Priamo Busenello, no. 126, 8 September 1499. 
56 “E chel non se posa far alguna chosa zenza la voluntade de mia muier Chataruzia”. NT 859,
Egidio Ravagnan, no. 236, 24 March 1404. 
57 “Le qual tute chose voio sia andade a sequicion plu presto se puol per i mie chomesari, over per
la maor parte, la qual maor parte voio sia la mia amabele consorte Lucia”. NT 1157, Croci, Prot II,
fol. 56v, 15 September 1451. 
58 NT 68, Girolamo Bonicardi, no. 72, 22 December 1485.  
59 “Item voio la dita fia no se podesse maridar senza voluntade de la dita soa mare, madona
Valvina”. NT 567, Bartolomeo fu Benvenuto, unnumbered wills, 1 June 1397
procura notarized which gave his wife, Franceschina, “full authority and power
to marry our daughter, Eufemia, to whoever seems to you most suitable and
to promise him whatever dowry and trousseau seem to you appropriate”60.
Fantin was authorizing Franceschina to make decisions that would not only
place Eufemia in marriage but also create or reinforce alliances between two
families. Such delegations by husbands to wives were discharged in practice.
Among 101 patrician marriage contracts from the fifteenth and early sixteenth
century, mothers took an active part in more than half, fifty-seven, either as
contractors, or by contributing to the bride’s dowry, or by backing up with
their own property the groom’s capacity to repay it at the end of the marriage61.
Some husbands formally assigned their prospective widows the status of
“donna et domina [vernacular donna e madonna] in domo sua,” which gave
them the statutory right to material support at the expense of the husband’s
estate as well as authority over the household62. Giulio Contarini made it clear
that giving his wife, Agnesina, that designation was part of a bargain putting
the prospective widow in charge of the children’s upbringing. After
bequeathing her and their children equal shares of his residuary estate, he
specified that Agnesina’s share was conditioned on her leaving her dowry in his
estate rather than reclaiming it, as was her right. But whether she reclaimed
it or not, she was still to be “donna e madonna with authority over her sons and
daughters as long as she lives,” with his estate paying her living expenses63.
Paolo Morosini made the same bargain, with an additional sanction. He too
wanted his wife to “stay with my sons” with their expenses borne by his estate,
and he instructed the sons “to treat their mother as donna e madonna”. To
put steel into his order he added, “and if they don’t, I want them deprived of
my bequest to them”64. Similarly determined, Giovanni da Mula, whose
appointment of his wife as his majority executor was noted above, left her
donna e madonna with lifetime usufruct of all his goods, including their five
sons’ inheritance, “and I do this so that my sons have reason to treat her well”.
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60 “ut amodo in antea pro me meoque nomine plenam virtutem et potestatem habeatis maritandi
Eufemiam filiam nostram, cui tibi melius videbitur et apparebit et eidem per dotem et nomine
dotis quicquid tibi videbitur promittere ac coredos [sic],” ASVe, Cancelleria Inferiore, Notai, busta
36, Giovanni Campion, protocollo II, fol. 2v, n.d. September 1364. 
61 Data from ASVe, various registers of Giudici del Proprio and Avogadori di Comun. These sources
will be described in detail in another study. On dowry-restitution procedures, see Bellavitis, 55-
72; Chojnacki, 2000b.
62 “& sit domina in domo”. Volumen Statutorum, lib. 4, cap. 15, 66v. In Florence, about one-third
of testating fathers designated that status for their wives: Chabot, 1999, 138. 
63 “che la sia dona e madona al governo de suo fiuoli e fie domentre la viverà. E se la volesse pagar
dela sua dota volio la sia privada de quanto lasso, zoè de la parte i tocherà de questa heredità
segondo la lasso emgual con suo fiuoli e fie. Ma volio che labia vito e vestito domentre la viverà,
stando al governo de suo fiuoli e fie”. NT 1129, Paolo Benedetto, no. 7, 28 July 1463. 
64 “Voio che mie fioli trata so mare per dona e madona e si no farà cusì voio li sia privadi de tuto
quelo laso”. Cancelleria Inferiore, Notai, b. 57, Benedetto dalle Croci, parchment no. 20, 8 February
1382/83.
To this economic leverage he added a moral injunction: “in order to have my
blessing they must be obedient to their mother and not stray from her advice
and orders”65. 
Other husbands delegated to their wives substantive authority without the
formal donna e madonna designation. The experience of marital partnership
had instilled in these men confidence in the women’s commitment to their
children and the family’s fortunes and their ability to administer both, taking
over the husband’s patronage responsibilities as head of the family. Leonardo
Priuli wanted his widow to be considered a father (“ut patre amisso”) to their
children66. Some husbands were forthright about their wives’ management
skills. In addition to giving his wife, Isabella, majority authority among his
executors, who also included a married sister and her husband, a widowed
sister, three maternal uncles, and two other nobles, Piero da Molin appointed
“my wife to be guardian [gubernatrix] of my children, both male and female,
and to keep them with her; and no one, whether on the basis of kinship or any
other claim, is to take them out of my wife’s hands and guardianship”67. For
good measure he ordered that his daughter Cornelia was to be married
“depending on the quantity and quality of my estate, at the discretion and
prudence of my wife, in whom I have complete confidence”68. Francesco Valier
ordered that his two daughters “remain under the authority of and be obedient
to the wise and respectable madona Isabella, their mother and my beloved
wife”. He made Isabella and the daughters his residuary heirs, on condition
that Isabella not reclaim her dowry but leave it in Francesco’s estate “for her
benefit and that of my daughters. And regarding her remarrying or remaining
a widow I add nothing, since I know her to be wise and prudent in all her
dealings and am certain that she will choose what is best for herself and her
honor and for the little girls”69. 
These and other men entrusted their wives with all or part of the
responsibilities associated with family headship. Noteworthy in themselves,
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65 “e questo faço azò che mie fioli habia chason de portarse ben desa [de essa] . . . E per la mia
benedicion i sia hobediente a sua mare, e non se parte de i consei e chomandamenti de quela”. NT
1157, Croci, Prot II, fol. 56v, 15 September 1451. 
66 “ut patre amisso et matris et patris loco”. NT 1239, Tomei, no. 413, 15 March 1477.
67 “ipsa uxor mea sit gubernatrix filiorum meorum tam masculi quam femine et penes se eos
retineat, et nullus possit tam ratione parentele quam aliter extrahere eos de manibus et
gubernatione dicte uxoris mee”. NT 1228, Cristoforo Rizzo, no. 328, 1 June 1494. 
68 “[V]olo maritari debere Corneliam filiam meam secundum qualitatem et quantitatem dicti mei
residui ad discretionem et prudentiam uxoris mee, de qua plenium confido”. Ibid.
69 “Item voglio che da poi la morte mia mie fie Marieta e Archanzoleta rimagna in governo e
hobedientia dela savia e honesta madona Ixabella sua madre e mia dileta consorte . . . Con questa
condicion che la dita madona Ixabella non se possi trar dela dita mia comessaria la sua dota che
me fo promesso duchati mille ma che la rimagna in la dita mia comessaria a suo beneficio e de le
dite mie fie ut dictum est. Non dirò altro del suo maridar e vedoar, cognosandola savia e
prudentissima in tute sue opere, siando certo lei elezerà el meglio per lei el plui so honor e per le
fiolete”. NT 1186, Domenico Groppi, no. 48, 2 November 1492. 
such departures from the overarching principle of male authority also put
widows, and sometimes wives, in the position of forging or reinforcing social
and economic relationships. An example is Cateruzza Vitturi, whose
nomination in 1448 by her husband, Moisè Venier, as his sole executor was
mentioned earlier, as was Moisè’s comment in the will that he was involved in
a lawsuit against his brothers70. In the 1460s Cateruzza registered her and
Moisè’s sons for the Barbarella, or Balla d’Oro, the annual lottery for eighteen-
year-old nobles that entitled winners to take their hereditary place in the Great
Council at the early age of twenty. Recognizing that the young men’s fortunes
depended on family support, in 1463 she recruited her own Vitturi brother to
stand surety that her son Girolamo was eighteen and legitimately born; three
years later, when she registered her youngest son, Moisè Jr, she persuaded her
sons’ paternal uncles to stand surety71. These uncles were the estranged
brothers that fifteen years earlier her husband had identified in his will as
adversaries in a lawsuit. Cateruzza thus effected a reconciliation between her
brothers-in-law and her sons, who would benefit from good relations with
uncles from their Venier lineage at the same time that their mother cultivated
their ties to her family of birth72.
Assigning executor authority over children and property was a decision by
husbands that gave wives opportunities for exercising economic and social
patronage themselves. But another aspect of husbands’ wills fostered the wives’
patronage role as brokers of collaboration between their families of birth and
of marriage. Above, we noted a few cases of men who bypassed their natal
families and lineages, instead favoring their wives in their commissaria
choices. That may seem anomalous, since membership in the lineage and
mutual support with family members were keys to prospering in the hereditary
patriciate. That was the reason that Cateruzza Vitturi reknit ties between her
sons and their father’s estranged brothers, who might be their nephews’
patrons in their economic and political adulthoods. It also explains why a solid
majority of the seventy-seven married male testators, 59.7 percent, included
natal kin among their executors. And yet, it cannot be ignored that the other
40.3 percent left their agnates out of their commissarie, forgoing lineage
support for children and property. Moreover, in the context of patrilineal
identity and interest even more noteworthy are the thirty-four of the seventy-
seven husbands, 44.2 percent, who chose affines; nineteen of these thirty-four
were wives’ kin, the others were spouses of the men’s siblings or children. Many
of these men coupled their in-laws with their wives and/or natal kinsmen,
electing to recruit a bilateral or even multilateral range of support for their
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70 Above, note 53.
71 ASVe, Avogadori di Comun, Balla d’Oro, reg. 164, fol. 326rv. On the Barbarella, or Balla d’Oro,
see Chojnacki, 2000c.
72 Besides Cateruzza’s brother, also standing surety at Girolamo’s registration was her cousin, a son
of her father’s sister. For other examples of mothers recruiting natal and affinal kin for their sons’
registrations, see Chojnacki, 2000c, 215-218.
intentions for their children and estates. The fact remains, though, that two-
fifths, thirty-one, of the seventy-seven husbands in the sample named no
agnate executors. Nine of these appointed their wives alongside affines, usually
the wives’ kin, and seventeen chose the wives alone or with their children. (The
commissari in the remaining five wills included wives together with officials
or with apparently unrelated persons.) In any case, the sovereign fact is that
sixty-one of the husbands in the sample, four out of five, entrusted their
interests wholly, primarily, or at least partially to wives who themselves, as we
have seen, relied heavily – indeed, considerably more heavily than did their
husbands – on executors from their natal families.
In parsing these catholic choices of married men ostensibly anchored in their
lineages it is good to bear in mind that a marriage between patrician families
was designed to expand the contracting parties’ range of social, political, and
economic resources. A man’s productive relations with his wife’s father or
brothers could work to the benefit of his natal family, and likewise to hers. Soon
after his wedding Moisè Venier joined his wife’s father and brother in a grain
importing business, while at the same time managing the economic affairs of his
own father, brothers, and other natal kinsmen73. In his will of 1427, Bulgaro
Vitturi worried that his two sons might be trying to cheat each other (“usurpare
bona alterius”); to bring about a reconciliation between the two brothers he
commissioned his wife’s brother74. A business dispute litigated before the civil
court of Petizion involved a partnership between Giovanni Gradenigo, his
mother’s brother, Marco Morosini, and his own brother-in-law, Francesco
Barbaro75. A frequent role of in-laws was participating in the Barbarella
registrations of their young affines. The registrations in 1449 of a couple of young
Morosini men, both named Alvise, illustrate the durability of such cross-marriage
collaboration. At the registration of Alvise di Nicolò Morosini, the young man’s
sponsor was his father’s brother Jacopo, and the guarantors of his eligibility were
a brother of Uncle Jacopo’s first wife and a brother of his current wife. One month
later, an even more tortuous connection, linking three different marriages,
operated at the registration of the other Alvise, son of a different Jacopo
Morosini, now deceased: one of the guarantors was the son-in-law of Alvise’s
mother, married to her daughter by her second husband, whereas Alvise was the
son of her first, the late Jacopo Morosini76.
The presence at these Barbarella registrations of in-laws, often
collaborating with the young registrants’ lineage mates, once more focuses
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73 ASVe, Procuratori di San Marco, Commissarie miste, b. 3A, Moisè Venier, red leather account
book.
74 NT 1157, Benedetto dalle Croci, protocollo, fol. 67v.
75 Procuratori di San Marco, commissarie miste, b. 78a, Carte Morosini, parchment 29 September
1427. Morosini had already received a business commission (procura) from another of his sister’s
kin 21 years earlier. Cancelleria Inferiore, notai, b. 170, protocollo 2, 10 December 1406.
76 Avogadori di Comun, Balla d’Oro, reg. 163, fol. 309r, 10 October and 6 November 1449. For
further discussion of this practice, with additional examples, see Chojnacki, 2000c, esp. 215-24.
attention on perhaps the most vital aspect of married women’s patronage,
promoting interfamilial relations. Earlier we observed men authorizing their
wives, once widowed, to see to the vocations of their daughters. The
counterpart of that is on display in mothers’ Barbarella activity: with no evident
encouragement in husbands’ wills, they fostered collaboration between their
families of birth and of marriage in the introduction of their sons into patrician
adulthood. A law of 1414, which gave the Barbarella its definitive structure,
identified fathers as the preferred sponsors of the young candidates77. This was
the surest way to determine the candidates’ legitimate patrician status, but
fathers deceased or away from Venice had to be replaced and, not surprisingly,
in their absence brothers and other lineage kin were the most frequent
replacements. Yet nearly two-fifths of these father-substitutes were the
candidates’ mothers, and the guarantors they recruited display their
interfamilial mediation78. In 755 Quattrocento registrations sponsored by
either the candidate’s mother or his father, nearly two-thirds, 65 percent, of the
guarantors belonged to neither parent’s natal lineage. Though a majority of
these seemingly unrelated guarantors were probably connected by marriage to
members of one or the other parent’s lineage, their selection was no doubt a
tactic calculated to advertise widespread familiarity with the young man’s
patrician credentials among nobles outside the family79. 
When they did look to their lineage connections for guarantors, however,
sponsoring fathers as well as sponsoring mothers called on both maternal and
paternal kin, with fathers recruiting their own kinsmen 70 percent of the time,
their wives’ kin the other 30 percent; mothers favored their natal kinsmen
slightly more frequently, 36 percent to 64 percent for their husbands’ kin80.
But the slight difference is less significant than the consensus of mothers and
fathers in selecting Barbarella guarantors as it was in appointing testamentary
executors. The dominant principle for both parents was, as in the example of
Cateruzza Vitturi noted earlier, solidifying their sons’ place in the patrilineage,
which in the end was the matrix of membership in the ruling class with all its
associations and benefits, while also cultivating the young men’s ties to uncles
and other kinsmen on their mother’s side. Examples abound. In 1468,
Agnesina Vitturi, widow of Nicolò Loredan, sponsored her son Andrea’s
Barbarella registration with, as guarantors, her own brother Domenico and
her late husband’s brother, Andrea’s “patruus,” Marco Loredan. Agnesina cast
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77 There were minor changes to the institution later in the Quattrocento, but in essentials the law
of 1414 was definitive. See Chojnacki, 2000c.
78 Of identifiable sponsors in 418 registrations with fathers absent, just over half, 52.1 percent,
belonged to the candidate’s patrilineage. Mothers accounted for 37.8 percent and maternal kin
another 10 percent. Ibid., table 14, p. 211. 
79 The 755 registrations are for sixteen patrician clans: Avogadori di Comun, Balla d’Oro, reg. 162,
163, and 164. See Chojnacki, 2000a, 208 and 321, notes 10, 12; also 216, table 15.
80 The exact figures: fathers engaged 143 (69.2%) of their own kinsmen, 108 (30.8%) wives’ kin;
mothers recruited 75 (63.6%) husbands’ kinsmen and 43 (36.4%) of their own kin.
her kinship net still wider when three years later she registered another son,
Giambattista: one of the guarantors was Giambattista’s cousin, Girolamo
Venier, the son of Agnesina’s widowed sister, Cateruzza, who as we saw above
had sponsored this Girolamo’s own registration eight years earlier81. Other
widows followed the same pattern as the Vitturi sisters. Registering her son
Piero, Elena Tron, widow of Benedetto Morosini, recruited as guarantors
Piero’s brother and her own natal kinsman Andrea Tron. Elisabetta Loredan,
wife of the absent Marco Mudazzo, registered her son Marino with, as
guarantors, her husband’s brother Nicolò Mudazzo and her own brother, Alvise
Loredan. Likewise Chiara Zusto, widow of Jacopo da Mula, recruited Jacopo’s
brother Alvise da Mula together with Alvise Zusto as guarantors when she
registered her son Francesco82.
Both in choosing testamentary executors and in assembling guarantors for
their sons’ Barbarella registrations, married patrician women used the
patronage possibilities of their dowry wealth and their husbands’ reliance on
them to further the stake they shared with their husbands in the adult
prospects of their children, male and female. Like their husbands they
nourished their relations with their families and lineages of birth, but their
children’s interests encouraged their cultivation of productive relationships
with their spouses’ families as well. The outcome of this bilateral loyalty and
its benefits was a new family orientation, a new family structure, the conjugal
family, with offsetting, complementary ties to the families that after all had
contracted the marriage, but with a primary focus on the fortunes of the new
family, of which patrician wives were willing patronesses.
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81 Avogadori di Comun, Balla d’Oro, reg. 164, fols. 203v (Andrea), 204r (Giambattista).
82 Ibid., fols. 217r (Piero Morosini), 273r (Marino Mudazzo), 274v (Francesco da Mula).
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Abstract
This essay is inspired by Ben Kohl’s 2001 article on Fina Buzzacarini da Carrara as wife, mother,
and art patron in fourteenth-century Padua. Ben examined Fina’s collaboration with her husband,
Francesco il Vecchio da Carrara, her bequests to her children and other persons, and her
expenditures for the construction of a tomb for herself and her husband in Padua’s Baptistery.
He showed the many ways in which a woman of substance, in this case the wife of the lord of
Padua, could use her wealth to give expression to her loyalty to family, church, and city. Shifting
the focus from signorial Padua to republican Venice, this essay will survey the benefactions of a
sample of patrician women from the late fourteenth to the early sixteenth century. While all such
bequests can be gathered under the umbrella of patronage, the different kinds of benefactions
and the different categories of legatees were expressions of different motivations: piety, family
loyalty, personal disposition. As with Fina da Carrara, drawing up a testament confronted women,
as it did men, with the need to sort out their hierarchies of affection, loyalty, responsibility, and
encouragement. They thus provide a measure of shifting loyalties as women moved from natal to
marital family; in the cases of women who wrote wills at different stages of their married and
widowed lives, they also display the evolution of the women’s social and religious preferences over
time. The argument is that, as Ben Kohl showed, patronage was protean and selective. In the case
of Venetian patrician women writing their wills, it also reflected the effects of time, changing social
environments, and personal choice. 
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